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MENS REA IN BIGAMY IN MARYLAND:
AN OBITUARY?
By T. B. HoGAN*
Art. 27, § 18 of the Maryland Code (1957) provides:
"Whosoever being married and not having obtained
an annulment or a divorce a vinculo matrimonii of said
marriage, the first husband or wife (as the case may
be) being alive, shall undergo a confinement in the
penitentiary for a period not less than eighteen months
nor more than nine years; provided, that nothing
herein contained shall extend to any person whose husband or wife shall be continuously remaining beyond
the seas seven years together, or shall be absent himself or herself seven years together, in any part within
the United States or elsewhere, the one of them not
knowing the other to be living at that time.. .."
In Braun v. State' a recent decision of the Court of
Appeals of Maryland, D appealed against his conviction
for bigamy on the ground, inter alia, "that when he entered
into the marriage with his second wife in Maryland in 1961,
he believed that his first wife had divorced him, [and] that
he, therefore, lacked any wrongful intent and hence was
not guilty of bigamy."2 Every student of criminal law will
recognise the problem: is mistake a defence to a charge
of bigamy? The court indicated that in Maryland it is not.
D's conviction and his sentence of five years' imprisonment
were affirmed.
In one sense that, so far as the law of Maryland is concerned, is that. The Court of Appeals has chosen to ally
itself with the majority of jurisdictions in the United States
in holding that a mistake as to the subsistence of the first
marriage is not a defence to a charge of bigamy, rather than
with the minority of states which hold that a bona fide
mistake, or a bona fide mistake on reasonable grounds,
does constitute a good defence. If there is room for anything, then, it is for lament rather than comment. Nevertheless, it is respectfully, and hopefully, submitted that
Braun is not the last word on the matter in Maryland so
that the matter is still open for comment.
* LL.B. Manchester; Lecturer of Law, University of Nottingham; Visiting Professor, Villanova University School of Law.
' 230 Md. 82, 185 A. 2d 905 (1962).
2Id.,
85.
1 See generally, PE KiNS, CRIMINAL LAW (1957) 835-842.
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The ratio decidendi of Braun.
The basis of this submission is that the ratio of Braun
is contained in the statement of the court, towards the end
of the judgment, that, "On the facts of this case we think
that (D) has failed to establish a bona fide and reasonable
belief that he was divorced."4 On any view this was enough
to dispose of the appeal and it is urged that this may
properly be treated as the ratio. What the court had to
say about the relevance of a bona fide mistake was therefore unnecessary to the decision in the case and may be
treated as obiter. This is not to say that what the court
had to say about mistake can be lightly disregarded since
the opinion on this point, even if obiter, was considered and
deliberate.
The mens rea of bigamy.
The mens rea of bigamy cannot, of course, be defined
in the abstract. Any self-respecting lawyer who is asked
to define this will require, at least as a starting point, to
see the relevant statutory provision if there is one. But
as an abstract proposition mens rea is capable of definition.
At any rate the philosophy underlying the concept is susceptible of explanation, and that philosophy was expressed
by the Supreme Court of the United States in these words:
"The contention that an injury can amount to a
crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial
or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent
in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the
human will and a consequent ability and duty of the
normal individual to choose between good and evil.
A relation between some mental element and punishment for a harmful act is almost as instinctive as the
the child's familiar exculpatory 'But I didn't mean to,'
and has afforded the rational basis for a tardy and
unfinished substitution of deterrence and reformation
in place of retaliation and
vengeance as the motivation
'5
for public prosecution.
Given that D brings about the actus reus of bigamy when,
being married to A, he enters into a ceremony of marriage
with B, that philosophy requires absolutely that D should
' Supra, n. 1.
5Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952). For a statement of
that same policy in connection with the offense of bigamy see 'MODEL
PENAL CODE (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955, § 207.2) and commentary
thereon at pp. 220-227.
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intend to enter into the ceremony with B in the knowledge
that he is still married to A. If D does not have that
knowledge, if D believes that he is no longer bound by the
ties of his marriage to A, then D has no rational basis to
choose between what is legal and what is illegal, what is
good and what is evil. In going through a ceremony of
marriage with B, believing that he is free to do so, D is
doing what he believes is good.
The problem of statutory construction.
It is, no doubt the fact that the legislature may dispense
with mens rea, and where a statute does so in clear terms
the court has no choice but to obey. But it is also the fact
that in many, if not most, instances the legislature gives no
clear clue as to its intent and the court must then determine the issue having regard to such matters as the historical background of the statute, its policy, the gravity of
the offence and the severity of the penalty, and the administration of the statute. What is not often expressly
recognised is that the evaluation of these factors usually
presents the court with a choice. In Braun, it is respectfully submitted, the court tacitly recognised this choice
when it said, "The problem of statutory construction is
rea to
primarily whether or6 not a requirement of mens
' 7
establish guilt should be read into the statute.
The court concluded that mens rea should not be read
into the statute because (i) in Maryland the statutory
offences of being in possession of lottery tickets or of
narcotics had been held to be offences not requiring mens
rea,s (ii) the underlying social purpose of the bigamy
statute was such as to put the offence on a par with "police
regulations", (iii) most other jurisdictions considering the
matter had concluded that mens rea was not essential to
the offence, and (iv) honest mistake was not an exception
enumerated by the statute. These reasons call for scrutiny.
6 My

italics.
Supra, n. 1, 89.
If. Commentary to MODEL PENAL CODE, supra, n. 5,
222: "The prevailing view is that such a defense is unavailing even if the
mistake was based on reasonable grounds. This position was reached
largely as a matter of construction of the language of statutes rather than
on policy grounds. Thus where the bigamy provision contains no words
like 'knowing' or 'wilful,' and where the legislature has explicitly excepted
cases of remarriage following actual death or divorce of the former
spouse, some courts feel themselves precluded from holding that a supposed death or divorce is -a defense. However, when the matter is considered afresh on policy grounds, there seems to be no valid reason to
stigmatize or punish remarriage by people who in good faith believe
themselves to be widows or widowers."
6 In Ford v. State, 85 Md. 465, 37 A. 172 (1897) and 'Jenkins v. State,
215 Md. 70, 137 A. 2d 115 (1957) respectively.
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(i) The argument by analogy certainly carries some
force in the construction of statutory offences, as it does
generally. English students are always puzzled to understand why in 1884 it was held that D could be convicted,
under the Licensing Act, 1872, § 13, of selling liquor to a
drunken person whom he did not know to be drunk, 9 and
in 1895 it was held that D could not be convicted, under
§ 16(2) of the very same Act, of selling liquor to a constable on duty because he did not know that the constable
was on duty.1" The analogy between the two provisions
appears to be too close to resist. But it is submitted that
no student, English or American, would be puzzled to
discover that a court had once held that being in possession
of lottery tickets or of narcotics did not require that D
should know that what he had in his possession was lottery
tickets or narcotics, and then subsequently held that D
could not be convicted of bigamy where he did not know
of the subsistence of his first marriage. There is no real
analogy here at all, and the possession cases afford no
plausible basis for the court's conclusion that mens rea
was not required for the offence of bigamy.
(ii) The court's opinion that bigamy is to be considered
on a par with that well known, if ill defined, class of minor
regulatory offences for which mens rea is not required is,
with respect, astonishing. By its language the court acknowledged the fact that the gravity of the offence is a
significant factor in determining whether to include or exclude mens rea, but chose to meet this difficulty by deciding
that bigamy "is to be considered on a par with various
police regulations where criminal intent is unnecessary."
It is just possible that these days society views bigamy with
little more disapprobation than selling adulterated milk or
failing to halt at a stop sign, but bigamy is viewed as a
serious crime by the Maryland legislature and by the Maryland courts; as witness D was here sentenced to five years'
imprisonment.
(iii) It is certainly the case that most jurisdictions have
held that mistake is not a defence to a charge of bigamy."
In view of the fact that bigamy is a statutory offence in
most jurisdictions, and that these statutes tend to follow a
similar pattern, this point clearly made its weight felt in
the court's decision. It is, after all, a weighty point. But
the court was concerned to interpret the legislation of
Maryland, was concerned to make a choice - for choice,
9 Cundy

v. LeCocq, 13 Q.B.D. 207 (1884).
10Sherras v. DeRutzen, 1 Q.B. 918 (1895).
n See PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW, 1OC. cit. supra, n. 3.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXIII

it is submitted, there was - for Maryland. In this choice
the weight of authorities in other States could not have
decisive importance. And it is not a matter of being insular
here: no one would have accused the Court of Appeals of
Maryland of insularity had it favoured mens rea in the
interpretation of its statute.
(iv) The most telling point the court made in favour
of its interpretation of the statute was that, applying the
ordinary canons of construction, it did not lend itself easily
to the inclusion of mens rea. On the face of it, where a
statute is in terms absolute (i.e., does not by the use of
words such as 'knowingly', 'maliciously' or 'unlawfully'
import mens rea) and then goes on to provide a specific
exception to its operation, this affords some ground for the
conclusion that the only defence the legislature intended
was the legislative exception. But is this the proper inference from § 18 of Art. 27 of the Maryland Code? Surely
this exception is of an extraordinary character in that it
provides a defence which, but for the exception, would not
have been available at common law. If the proviso had
been omitted from § 18 it must be clear that though a court
might legitimately conclude that what is a defence to a
charge of crime at common law (insanity, duress, mistake
of fact and the like) would be a defence under the statute,
the court would hardly conclude that seven years absence
of the former spouse, coupled with an absence of belief
that the former spouse is alive during that time, could constitute a defence. That would be a clear arrogation of the
legislature's powers. The exception thus has a perfectly
understandable explanation which does not compel the
conclusion that it was intended to be the only defence.
The exception may be taken merely to add to the defences
which are available: it need not negative all other
defences. 2
If the court takes the other view, that the legislative
creation of a specific defence negatives other defences, then
the court may find itself embarrassed where the defence is
insanity or duress. Since the statute makes no mention
" In other words it is at least plausible to assume that the legislature
wished to provide for those unhappy cases where D, not knowing of
anything which would induce a ,belief in the death of the former spouse,
had yet not heard of the former spouse for a number of years. It is
thus tacit in ithe legislative intention that a belief in the death of the
former spouse would constitute a defence, and the exception was to
provide for those cases where there was no actual belief in the death of
the former spouse. It is really inconceivable that the legislature would
provide a defence for which an actual belief in the death of the former
spouse was not necessary, and yet leave defenceless the person who has
an actual belief in the death of the former spouse.
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of these as a possible defence, must the defence of insanity
and duress also go to the wall? It is thought that no court
would take so extreme a view, but if the statute is approached in the same fashion it is difficult to see why it
must exclude the defence of mistake of fact but not the
defence of insanity.
The court also recognised § 18 as being the child of a
statute of James I in 1604,'13 and if the two provisions
are put side by side it is certainly a case of like father like
son. The preamble to the Act of James is illuminating:
"Forasmuch as divers evil disposed persons being
married, run out of one country into another, or into
places where they are not known, and there become
to be married, having another husband or wife living,
to the great dishonour of God, and utter undoing of
divers honest mens children. .. ."
Although the preamble is not part of the Act, and although "evil disposed" is a crude expression for mens rea,
it is submitted that if the Stuart courts had felt any doubt
whether the Act of James imported mens rea, the preamble
would have resolved those doubts in favour of mens tea.
The problem of mistake of Law.
The court did not decide whether D's mistake was one
of fact or law but it took the position, following its own
previous decision in the civil case of Geisselman v. Geisselman,14 that a mistake of law would no more constitute a
defence than mistake of fact. Given that the offence of
bigamy does not require mens rea it follows inevitably that
mistake of law is no more a defence than mistake of fact.
But given that the court holds, or is prepared to hold, that
bigamy requires mens rea then it may become relevant to
discuss whether D's mistake is one of law or fact, because,
as is well known, mistake of fact is generally a defence
whereas mistake of law generally is not.
Whether D made a mistake of fact or law in Braun is
perhaps difficult to ascertain affirmatively from the report.
Probably his mistake was one of fact since it appears that
he simply believed (or alleged that he believed) that his
wife had divorced him. A useful rule of thumb guide is
that D cannot make a mistake of law unless he knows the
facts, and as D was not apparently in possession of the
facts, his mistake was not of law but of fact. Suppose,
1 Jac. I, c. 11.
" 134 Md. 453, 107 A. 185 (1919).
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however, that his mistake is one of law: is he now rendered
defenceless by virtue of the general rule that mistake of
law is no defence?
In England the offence of bigamy is governed by § 57
of the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861,"5 which is,
in terms, much the same as § 18 of Art. 27 to the Maryland
Code, deriving, as it does, from the same parent statute of
James I. In Braun the court adverted to the two well
known English cases of Tolson16 and Wheat & Stocks17 in
the former of which it was held that a belief in the death
of the former spouse was a good defence to bigamy, and
in the latter that a belief in the dissolution of the former
marriage was no defence. The distinction between the two
cases is sometimes put on the ground that the mistake in
Tolson was one of fact but in Wheat & Stocks was one of
law. If this is the case then the result is unfortunate. In
the first place it may be an exceedingly complex matter
to determine whether the mistake is one of law or fact,
and, secondly, D's guilt is then made to turn upon a technical matter which it is unlikely he would ever comprehend.
It is argued here that there have been some misconceptions about mistake of law as a defence to crime. If D's
mistake of law is such that he is unaware that he is bringing about the actus reus of a crime (as, for example, where
D, knowing that he is married to A, marries B in the belief
that the law permits polygamy) then his mistake is no
defence. No one would doubt that. On the other hand, if
D's mistake of law is such that it prevents him forming
the mens rea of the crime this may be held to be a good
defence without in any way invalidating the general principle. Thus if D, by virtue of a mistake of law, believes
that he is free to marry again he does not have the mens
rea of bigamy, although he has brought about the actus
reus, and he ought to be acquitted. If this view were accepted the court would not need to determine the character
of D's mistake as to the first marriage, since in either event
the mistake prevents the formation of mens rea.8
The effect of the exclusion of mens rea.
It is often thought that whatever demerit the exclusion
of mens rea may have, it is offset by its simplification of
the administration of the law. Thereafter the court is not
concerned with any difficulties in the proof of mens tea;
& 25 Vict., c. 100.
23 Q.B.D. 168 (1889).
172 KB. 119 (1921).
18 Cf. PEBRINS, CRIMINAr LAW (1957) 836.
524
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it is enough to fix D with liability that he has brought
about the acts prescribed by law. In bigamy this usually
means that the court is not concerned to discover whether
D knew that he was still bound by the first marriage when
he entered into the second ceremony. But is this really the
fact? Surely the single most important factor the court
will consider in sentencing D will be whether D knew, or
did not know, that he was married to A when he went
through the ceremony with B. No court that is satisfied
that D made a genuine mistake is going to send him to
prison; to do so would be to return to a darker age. In
short the court will want to know in any event whether
D had mens rea. Thus in most jurisdictions when a court
holds that bigamy does not require mens rea it merely
removes its determination from the jury to the court. It
is submitted the position is in substance the same where,
as is usually the case in Maryland, the case is tried before
a judge alone. The only difference would seem to be that
where the judge sits alone he can do overtly (since determination of the facts is within his province) what the judge
who sits with a jury is doing covertly.1 9
The reasonablenessof the mistake.
It was pointed out by the court that in those states
where mistake has been held to be a defence it has usually
been required not only that the mistake be bona fide but
that it be based on reasonable grounds. Just a word about
this. On principle, D does not have mens rea where he
makes a bona fide mistake, whether it is a reasonable mistake or not. The reasonableness of the mistake may be
taken into account by the jury in deciding whether D is
to be believed, but if D is believed he ought to be acquitted
no matter how unreasonable his mistake. Insisting on the
reasonableness of the mistake makes bigamy a crime of
negligence. There may be something to be said for this in
view of the uncertainty which shrouds the exercise of
divorce jurisdiction in some of the states, but it is submitted
that a requirement only that D act in good faith is enough
to protect the interest of the prosecuting state. Proof that
D failed to take reasonable steps to assure himself of the
19What happens in Maryland in the unusual contingency of a bigamy
trial with a jury is less clear. I am indebted to the Editor for calling my
-attention to special features of Maryland Constitutional Law, particularly
9 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 15, § 5, of which I was ignorant. My limited
acquaintance with this somewhat bizarre provision leads me to conclude
that the end result must be the same - the court will want to be satisfied that D's mistake was not genuine before he is sentenced to a term of
imprisonment.
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validity of the dissolution of the former marriage will be
potent evidence of bad faith which D will find hard to challenge, but if it is shown, notwithstanding the unreasonableness of the mistake, that D did in fact act in good faith and
genuinely believed that he was free to marry again, it is
submitted that there is no 2 good
policy which requires that
0
D be treated as a criminal.
Conclusion.
The basic trouble with Braun is its timidity. The Court
of Appeals, called upon to face an old problem, produced
the old answer. It affords an excellent example of what
Dean Pound called mechanical jurisprudence.2 ' In go the
authorities at one end, and they are briefly incubated by
the court to produce an infant which can be recognised by
all as the child of its parents. It is respectfully submitted
that it would have been better if this infant had been
still-born in Maryland. It has been further submitted that
Braun is not decisive on the mens rea of bigamy and it is to
be hoped that this important problem will be reconsidered.
The Model Penal Code, although it does not require that the mistake
be reastonable when it concerns the death of the first spouse or the
validity of an existing judgment purporting to dissolve the marriage,
otherwise requires a reasonable belief in eligibility for remarriage for a
defence. MODEL 'PENAL CODE § 230.1. For further information see MODEL
PENAL CODE § 207.2 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955) and commentary thereon.
III JURISPRUDENCE, pp. 510-512.

